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Abstract—In this paper we analyse the problem of providing
an user-managed system for sharing the user’s location infor-
mation in the Future Internet of Services, and propose some
architectural mechanisms to support this kind of system. Our
approach is based on the work done within Kantara’s UMA
WG. Furthermore, we highlight open issues that still need to be
addressed in location information sharing scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of People, Things and Services will enable
a future ambient lifestyle where everything and everyone
could be interconnected everywhere and at anytime. Context-
aware personalised services will support daily life in intelligent
environments around us. One of the most popular context
information already today is location. Sustainable success,
however, depends strongly on how users can keep under
control who and what can get access to personal information
when and where.
Nowadays, location information of mobile entities can be
obtained very easily. GPS-based receivers are available in most
modern mobile handsets. Furthermore, the location of a mobile
device can also be determined, with more or less accuracy,
using as reference the nearest cellular or WiFi base stations.
As technologies mature and become available, there is an
increasing use of the location information. With more or
less success, a bunch of location based service are currently
deployed and can be accessed through Internet. Some of these
services help the user to use her own location information
for her own benefit (navigation, find nearby restaurants, etc.)
and others allow the user to share her location information
with other users or applications like Google Latitude [1], Fire
Eagle [2] or Dopplr [3]. Examples of specific services offered
by these Web applications are seeing in a map where your
friends are, receiving an alert when you are close to some
friend, receive suggestions specific to where you are, etc.
When users store information at some Internet node (within
the cloud) and want to share it with other applications and
users, privacy is an issue [4]. Regarding location information,
Duckham and Kulik define location privacy as “a special type
of information privacy which concerns the claim of individuals
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
location information about them is communicated to others”
[5]. For example, a user may want to share her specific location
while shopping with some of her friends but share only the
neighborhood where she is with other friends. Or you may
want to share your location with some colleague temporarily
till you meet with him but not further in time.
In the last decade, location privacy has been extensively
addressed by academia. Duckam and Kulik identify four
types of location privacy protection strategies in their survey
on location privacy [5]: regulatory strategy, privacy policies,
anonymity and obfuscation. Several of them can be used at
the same time by privacy protecting systems.
The first approach considers the development of regulatory
frameworks such as the EU Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy
and electronic communications [6]. These frameworks provide
general rules to protect citizens privacy and they are usu-
ally based on the same principles [7]. The second approach
considers the definition of privacy policies that specify who
can access the user’s data, in which manner and under which
conditions. Ardagna et al. present in [8] a good description of
some representative privacy-based access control systems for
location information.
Third approach considers anonymizing the location infor-
mation for a user. A first group of these techniques disso-
ciate the location information from the user’s real name by
using pseudonyms instead. A second group of anonymizing
techniques create ambiguity about which entity, among a
group, the reported location information belongs to. Fourth
approach to protect location privacy encompasses techniques
that degrade the quality of the location information, such as
providing the city where a user is instead of a more specific
location information. A survey of representative techniques
following the third and fourth approaches can be found in [9].
Description of the problem. Excluding regulatory frame-
works (they establish very general principles and are usually
independent from technology), existing solutions do not fully
satisfy the requirements imposed by the open Web 2.0 environ-
ment and much less the ones imposed by the foreseen Future
Internet. In the anywhere, anytime and any way Future Inter-
net, a full world of location-aware services will be available for
users. Users will want to share their location information with
these services and also that these services cooperate between
them, then sharing the user location information if necessary,
to provide users with a better personalized experience.
Anonymization techniques may be an option for some type
of location based services, but in the location sharing scenarios
we address in this work, a user specifically wants that other
users know her location. This means that the users receiving
the location information can identify somehow the user whose
location is being shared (that is, her real identity, one of her
email accounts, a pseudonym in some system, etc.).
A combination of privacy policies and obfuscation tech-
niques seems appropriate for allowing a user-managed loca-
tion information sharing. In fact, currently deployed location-
based web services that allow location information sharing
usually provide their users with this type of privacy preserving
mechanisms. For example, Google Latitude allows to share
the best available location or the city level with other users
or applications. Fire Eagle allows its users to share the most
precise available location information or one of the levels in
the structure Fire Eagle uses to describe location information
(country, state, town...).
Unfortunately, these mechanisms are not enough. Location-
based web applications are already deploying mechanisms that
allow users to share in an automatic and transparent manner
their location information with other web applications, most
of them using the OAuth protocol [10]. For example, Dopplr
users can share their location information with Facebook and
Fire Eagle very easily; other applications allow to share a
user’s Fire Eagle location with Facebook [11] and Twitter
[12] in both directions; and others allow updating Fire Eagle
location from Google Latitude.
Users may end up sharing their location information among
several web applications (see a real example in [13]) and
they may lose control of who they are sharing their location
information with and in which manner. Furthermore, currently,
users of location sharing web services must configure the
preferred sharing policies in each of them, having to cope with
possible different policy options and terms. If users wish to
make any change in their sharing policies at a global level (for
example, stop sharing best available location and share city
level instead), they have to propagate this change manually
in all the location sharing web services they have an account.
This situation is unacceptable in the foreseen Future Internet
scenario. Users should have a mechanism that allows them
to easily manage in a personalized way the sharing of their
location information between services and users, and to have a
global and understandable view of which location information
they are sharing with and how this information is shared.
Goal and contributions. In this work we have as goal
to provide some light regarding the design and integration
of adequate personalized privacy preserving mechanisms for
sharing location information between Future Internet web
services and other users.
Our proposal is based on the work developed within the
User-Managed Access (UMA) Working Group1 [15] and
1The UMA WG is part of the Kantara Initiative [14]
intends to contribute to it. The purpose of the UMA WG
is to develop specifications that let an individual control
the authorization of data sharing and service access made
between on line services on the individual’s behalf, and to
facilitate interoperable implementations of the specification.
The specifications developed so far are the identification of
the requirements [16], the elaboration of a set of scenarios and
use cases (including at the moment a basic description of a
location sharing scenario) [17], the definition of protocols and
protocol’s profiles [18]–[20] and data structures [21] needed
to satisfy the elicited requirements. Furthermore, a discussion
of legal implications [22] is also being elaborated. Most of
them are still work in progress.
In this paper we analyze the problem of providing an user-
managed system for sharing the user’s location information in
the Future Internet, and propose a UMA based architecture
to support this kind of system. To do so, we present a set
of uses cases where users share their location information
with location-aware services and other users, and study the
specific new requirements that arise in them compared to
the requirements already considered within the UMA work.
Then, for each use case, we propose and discuss possible
architectural mechanisms that would allow to address the
identified requirements. Furthermore, we highlight other open
issues that would be interesting to address within the UMA
framework, for location information sharing scenarios and
other scenarios which may have the same needs.
Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as
follows. Section II briefly describes the UMA architecture and
the UMA 1.0 Core Protocol. Then, in Section III we analyze
the use cases, identify their requirements and propose some
architectural solutions. Section IV presents a summary of our
work and a description of some identified open issues.
II. USER-MANAGED ACCESS ARCHITECTURE AND
PROTOCOL
In the UMA architecture, the Authorizing User (see Fig-
ure 1) manages a set of resources at one or several Hosts
within Internet. Requesters are the entities that want to access
(read, write, etc.) a specific resource owned by the Authorizing
User and stored at some Host. Requesters may act on behalf of
some Requesting Party, which can be a web user, a corporation
or any other legal person.
The Authorizing User delegates the decision of authorizing
or not a request submitted by Requesters to a distinct entity
called the Authorization Manager (AM). The Authorizing User
controls the authorization decisions taken by the Authorization
Manager by configuring a set of policies that establish for
each resource owned by the Authorizing User at each Host,
the conditions that must be met in order to grant access.
In comparison with the XACML model [23], there is the
following relation between the used terms (showing first the
UMA term and, second, the XACML model term): Autho-
rizing User↔Policy Administration Point (PAP), Authoriza-
tion Manager↔Policy Decision Point (PDP), Host↔Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP), and Requester↔Subject.
Fig. 1. This figure shows the entities of the UMA architecture and their
relations. Source: UMA WG [15]
The UMA 1.0 Core Protocol has three main steps which are
briefly described next (an illustration of its flow can be found
at [24]). It is built on top of two OAuth 2.0 flows [10].
• Step 1: Authorizing User introduces Host to AM. In
this step the Authorizing User grants the Host the right
to use the AM services in order to obtain authorization
decisions regarding the resources owned by the Autho-
rizing User and that are stored at the Host. To acomplish
this, the Host has to register as an OAuth client at the
AM, obtain the authorization grant from the Authorizing
User in the form of an OAuth authorization code and,
using this authorization code, obtain an OAuth access
token (known as the host access token) from the AM
that would allow the Host to use the AM authorization
services in next interactions with this entity. This would
be the first OAuth flow. At this point, the Host may also
register the protected resources at the AM as scopes [20].
• Step 2: Requester gets access token from AM. This
step and the third one form the second OAuth interaction
considered in the UMA 1.0 Core Protocol. In this second
step, it is assumed that the Requester has registered at
the AM (if not, a dynamic registration method has been
proposed [19]). Therefore, it is possible for the Requester
to obtain a requester access token from the AM in order
to access a specific resource at some Host (scope at
the AM), provided that the conditions determined by the
Authorizing User are met (which may include the presen-
tation of specific claims by the Requester). Otherwise, the
authorization request is rejected. The Requester may try
first to access the resource at the Host without presenting
a requester access token, then he is redirected to the
appropriate interface of the AM to perform the process
described previously in this step.
• Step 3: Requester wields access token at Host to gain
access. In this step, the Requester tries to access the
protected resource at the Host by presenting the access
token obtained in step 2. The Host then can validate the
token locally or request the AM to validate it. After an
authorization decision has been made by the Host or the
AM, the access to the resource is allowed or denied.
Most of the UMA specifications are still work in progress
and a description of some of the open issues that are currently
being addressed can be found in [25].
III. USER-MANAGED LOCATION INFORMATION SHARING:
ANALYSIS OF USES CASES AND PROPOSAL OF
ARCHITECTURAL MECHANISMS
In this Section we analyze a set of location information
sharing use cases, identify the new requirements they arise
and propose some architectural solutions.
A. Administration of sharing policies from the user’s mobile
Alice lives in the Vancouver area and because of work
reasons she travels quite frequently inside this area and along
the West coast, some times by car or bike, some times by
airplane and others using the public transport. Additionally,
because of the nature of her work, she may enjoy several
unexpected holiday days from time to time. She usually takes
advantage of these days by making a trip with her partner,
Teo, who works as a freelance photographer and can make
the most of these trips by taking some nice photos.
As her movements are a little bit unplanned, Alice wants
to share her actual location with some people and services. In
first place, Alice wants to share her location with her partner.
To do so, she uses the Google Latitude mobile application
on her Android mobile. This application can determine the
mobile’s location by several means and send it to the Google
Latitude service. In order to share her location information
with her friends and allow her friends to see where she is
on a map or receive an alert when they are close to each
other, Alice uses a Location Sharing Authorization Manager
(LSAM) service. Alice configures in the LSAM whom and
under which circumstances she wants to share her location
information stored at Google Latitude 2.
Her partner, Teo, has also an Android mobile, so he likes
too to use Google Latitude to see where Alice is. Teo also
allows Alice to see his location and, by default, both of them
allow each other to see the neighborhood3 where they are.
Sometimes they want the other to know their best available
location so they can meet more easily. In order to do so, they
change temporarily the policy at the LSAM from their mobiles.
1) Discussion and architecture: Most of the requirements
of this scenario can be solved by the current UMA 1.0 Core
Protocol. In this case, Alice is the Authorizing User, the Host
is Google Latitude, Teo is the Requesting Party, the Google
Latitude Mobile Application at Teo’s mobile handset is the
Requester (that is, the Requester is also Google Latitude via
2Currently, Google Latitude allows its users to configure basic privacy
policies for sharing their location information with other Google Latitude
users. Note that we are not describing what currently happens, but what would
happen if services would be UMAnized (that is, UMA compliant instead of
OAuth compliant, that is what happens now)
3Choosing neighborhood as location granularity for sharing is not possible
at the moment in Google Latitude.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the administration of sharing policies from the user’s
mobile use case: Entities and their interactions.
the Google Latitude Mobile Application at Teo’s handset) and
the Authorization Manager is the Location Sharing Autho-
rization Manager. The involved parties for this use case and
their interactions are shown seen in Figure 2. Assuming that
Google Latitude has already registered at the LSAM, step 1.2
in Figure 2 represents the interactions between the Google
Latitude Mobile Application at Teo’s handset and the LSAM
to obtain the access token, step 1.3a represents the interactions
between the Google Latitude Mobile Application at Teo’s
handset and Google Latitude service for accessing Alice’s
location, and step 1.3b represents the interactions between
the LSAM and Google Latitude service to validate the access
token presented by the Google Latitude Mobile Application at
Teo’s handset in its request.
A further requirement illustrated by this scenario is that,
as authorizing users are assumed to be moving and have a
“locatable” mobile device, it would be nice that they can
change their location sharing policies from these devices. One
way to solve this issue is that the LSAM provides a mobile
compliant web interface. The main problem with this solution
is that, if users want to link several location sharing services
and have personalized policies for each of them, it can be quite
complex to show this information in a usable way through the
mobile interface.
The alternative solution that we propose is to deploy an
specific application in the mobile handset (shown in Figure 2
as MyMobileLSAM) capable of dealing with the authoriza-
tion management (for this specific use case, only policy
administration functionalities are delegated) in this type of
resource-constrained platforms and which interacts with the
authorization manager. One approach for the design of the
MyMobileLSAM is to have at the handset a copy of the
location sharing policies. MyMobileLSAM should be capable
of showing them in an appropriate way to Alice depending of
the resources available in the handset. Alice then would be able
to change her location sharing policies locally, as she would
do at the LSAM, or by selecting between a predetermined set
of policies she would have previously defined at the LSAM.
Changes made locally would be submitted by MyMobileL-
SAM to the LSAM using the most efficient channel available
for that specific handset. This update can be made similarly
in the other direction if changes are made at the LSAM.
Deploying a local LSAM with policy administration func-
tionalities delegated by the LSAM, rises several security
requirements that should be considered (authentication of
MyMobileLSAM to LSAM, management of the authorization
regarding the delegated functionalities, etc.). However, it is
worth that authorizing users have this alternative to adminis-
tering their policies at the LSAM from their mobile hadsets
through Web interfaces appropriate for constrained-resource
platforms because of efficiency reasons (it would be more
efficient to make changes locally and then send them using
whatever connection technology) and the possibility of taking
full advantadge of specific handset features that would provide
a better user experience while managing their policies.
Furthermore, most of the location updaters used by the
mentioned location-based web services assume or recommend
a continuous Internet connectivity at the handset (via WiFi
or with specific data plans contracted to mobile operators)
in order to determine the location and update it at the
location-based web service. Not all users and handsets may
be able or willing to meet the continuous Internet connectivity
requirement, but in the case of mobile telephone handsets,
location-based web services are still possible as its location
can be determined by the mobile operator, which would act
as Host for the rest of location-based web applications. In
this situation, designing a non Web-based local LSAM is an
advantage.
B. User-managed sharing between multiple hosts
Apart from her partner, Alice has also some other friends
who she wants to share her location information with, for
example, her best friend Martha. Martha prefers to use Yahoo’s
Friends on Fire! application for Facebook to see her friends
whereabouts, as she is usually logged in Facebook at her
notebook and, therefore, finds this application more conve-
nient. To share her location with Martha and other friends
that use Friends on Fire!, Alice has also an account at Fire
Eagle location-based web service. Fire Eagle acts as a broker
for its user’s location information, accepting several location
updaters and consumers. In fact, from time to time, Alice
chooses to use the Android Fire Eagle Updater in her mobile
handset, which has a better performance in some situations. It
updates her location at Fire Eagle instead of at Google Latitude
service in first instance, but this is not a problem because
Alice has configured in the LSAM that they share her location
information so when one receives an update, the other can as
well update its location information for Alice accordingly. This
way, Teo and her other Google Latitude friends can access
Alice’s location information as before.
1) Discussion and architecture: The need arised in this use
case is how to coordinate and authorize the sharing of Alice’s
location information between several hosts assumming that
all the hosts are going to access this information indistinctly
and that an update of Alice’s location can be done at any
host at any moment. We are going to focus the discussion on
Fig. 3. Illustration of the user-managed sharing between multiple hosts use
case: Entities and their interactions for the PUSH mode
the specific example where Alice (Authorizing User) uses the
Android Fire Eagle Updater to update her location information
at Fire Eagle and Teo (Requesting Party) requests Alice’s
location using the Google Latitude Mobile Application at
his handset (Requester). Furthermore, the example focuses
on sharing location information between two Hosts (Google
Latitude and Fire Eagle), but they could be more.
To solve this requirement, we propose that the LSAM gives
Alice the option to configure a federation of hosts for some of
her resources, in this use case, her current location. This would
mean that the federated hosts are going to share these resources
between them and they are going to cooperate in order that
these resources, updated dynamically at any of them, are
synchronized. We assume that the hosts have been introduced
to the LSAM and that they have registered their scopes for
Alice’s location (step 1 of the UMA 1.0 Core Protocol). Then,
when Alice accesses the LSAM to configure the policies for
her location at these host, she may choose to federate these
scopes with others regarding the same information at different
hosts. Also, when Alice desires to defederate a host, the LSAM
should notify the rest of federated hosts. At the moment, the
UMA framework does not consider this possibility, so it should
be extended to address this proposal if convenient.
Once the hosts have been federated for some scope, their
behaviour in order to propagate the location information
between them can be shaped in different ways, once one of
them receives an update (in the specific example, Fire Eagle is
the primary host that receives the update of Alice’s location).
We have identified three options: push mode, pull mode and
delegation mode.
The suggested interactions between the different entities and
the configuration in the LSAM for the push mode are shown
in Figure 3. In this mode, Fire Eagle acting as a Requester,
tries to update the location information for Alice at Google
Latitude, who acts as Host. In order to do so, Fire Eagle
retrieves an access token from the LSAM to write Alice’s
Fig. 4. Illustration of the user-managed sharing between multiple hosts use
case: Entities and their interactions for the PULL mode
location at Google Latitude (step 1.2 in Figure 3). Then, Fire
Eagle sends the request for writing Alice’s location and the
access token to Google Latitude (step 1.3a), who validates the
token by sending it to the LSAM (step 1.3b) and enforces
the decision of the LSAM to authorize the location update.
Finally, Teo interacts with Google Latitude and the LSAM as
in the previous use case (steps 2.2, 2.3a and 2.3b in Figure 3).
Of course, the push mode needs that federated hosts imple-
ment locally some mechanism that allows them to know which
other hosts have to be updated regarding this specific resource
and, once a new location information has been received, launch
the process for updating it at the rest of the federated hosts.
Also, it has to be taken into account that, although it seems
a simple solution, the primary host (the first who receives the
information) increases its load more than the other hosts in
the federation.
The suggested interactions between the different entities and
the configuration in the LSAM for the pull mode are shown in
Figure 4. In this case, we suggest that the primary host, Fire
Eagle in our example, is in charge of sending alerts to the
rest of hosts in the federation after the reception of an update.
Then, the rest of the hosts in the federation, after receiving
the alert and if they need to update the information, retrieve
it from the primary host.
The information that Alice’s location has changed is sen-
sitive by itself (Alice is no more where she was), so it may
be convenient to provide access control mechanisms for the
alerts. A possible solution is to provide this access control
at the LSAM by letting “subscribe to alert” and “alert” be
additional actions that are configured in the sharing policies
when hosts are federated. Of course, all federated hosts should
implement an alert service and keep track of the rest of hosts
subscribed to it.
The subscription to the alerts should be done only once.
In Figure 4 it is shown how Google Latitude subscribes to
Fire Eagle’s alert service regarding Alice’s location (steps 1.2,
Fig. 5. Illustration of the interoperable hierarchical structure for location
information use case: Current representation of location information in each
location-based web service.
1.3a and 1.3b). In this interaction, Google Latitude would act
as Requester and Fire Eagle as the Host.
Alerts should be sent each time an update is received. The
sending of the alerts could also be authorized at LSAM if
it provides some advantage. Authorizing each alert by using
UMA is clearly inefficient but, on the other side, it provides
a more robust assurance regarding that only the authorized
parties ae notified by the authorized parties about a change of
Alice’s location. This interaction is shown in steps 2.2, 2.3a
and 2.3b in Figure 4, where Google Latitude acts as the Host
and Fire Eagle as the Requester.
Although, authorizing each alert may be not convenient
in most settings, another option is to take advantage of the
duration attributes of the OAuth access tokens and the OAuth
refreshing mechanism to reach some kind of compromise for
efficiency and security. This alternative can be also applied
to the push mode for authorizing the primary host to update
Alice’s location information at the rest of the federated hosts.
As in the push mode, finally, Teo interacts with Google
Latitude and the LSAM (steps 4.2, 4.3a and 4.3b in Figure 4).
A third option, the delegation mode, would be to consider
multi-layered delegation of the authorization in the line of
some of the proposals made within the OAuth WG [26].
This mode is interesting because it would allow a setting
where it is not mandatory that every host in the federation
stores or accesses the location information in order to make it
available to third parties, as the idea is that they act as proxies
regarding authorization only, but that they do not actually
retrieve and send the requested location. The proposal in [26],
however, has not evolved much beyond the original idea due
lack of implementation experience and they need still more
discussion to reach a consensus. The interest and efficiency of
other alternative mechanisms should also be researched, for
example, a chain of federated hosts using the push mode.
C. Interoperable hierarchical structure for location
Alice is having a rest from work and decides to enter
a nearby shopping mall (commercial center) to have a cof-
fee. While she is at the coffee shop, she receives an alert
from Google Latitude telling her that Teo is also within
the surrounding area. She decides to use the specific mall’s
location determination service (based on the free WiFi network
deployed inside the mall) to retrieve at her handset the specific
location of the coffee shop where she has stopped. She wants
to make this information available to Teo to let him get
concrete directions inside the mall to reach the coffee shop
using the mall’s location navigation service. To do so, she
introduces the retrieved location information manually in the
Android Fire Eagle Updater 4. She wants that this information
propagates till Teo through her federation of location-based
services, as she has configured at the LSAM.
1) Discussion and architecture: The first problem that
arises in this use case (see Figure 5) is that the set of location-
based web services need an interoperable language to ex-
change the location information about their users. In Figure 5
the current structures used by each service to represent location
information are shown. The location provided by the mall’s
location determination service can be of any form, but let
us assume that it takes the form of the address of the mall
and an internal identifier for the coffee shop’s local. When
Alice updates her location information at Fire Eagle, Fire
Eagle will do an interpretation of this location information
in order to store it using its structure for representing location
information. The address of Alice will be updated with the
mall’s address but the information about the coffee shop will
be probably lost. Again, when Google Latitude tries to retrieve
Alice’s location information from Fire Eagle (assumming the
pull mode is used), it expects a pair of latitude and longitude
coordinates. A geocoding process has to be done in order to
get the coordinates from the address, either by Fire Eagle or
by Google Latitude. At the end, in this specific example, most
of the location information, having possibly suffered some
transformation in the process, would propagate through Fire
Eagle and Google Latitude till it reaches Teo, except for the
specific location of the coffee shop inside the mall (which is
in fact the more interesting data for Teo in order to get the
directions inside it).
The problem is caused because the location of some entity
respect to the Earth can be described following different
perspectives and current location-based services do not provide
the location information for an entity in the same way.
The most common systems currently used to identify or
describe the geographical location of some feature are the
coordinate reference systems (e.g., WGS84 latitude and longi-
tude), geographical grid systems, geographical names (areas,
regions, localities, cities, towns, or other topograhical features
of public interest), administrative units and addresses (which
4This software has already the option of introducing a location manually.
We imagine that the location can also be retrieved from a local file to avoid
Alice typing it.
include a geographical name). Humans beings are more happy
to work with semantic locations instead of with raw coordi-
nates (generally unmeaningful for the common public).
The OGC Geography Markup Language (GML) Encoding
Standard [27] describes an encoding specification for geodata
in XML that enables the storage, transport, processing, and
transformation of geographic information. It is widely used in
Geographic Information Systems but, usually, it is not used by
location-based services for representing the location of entities.
Instead, these services use their own and simpler languages
and structures for representing the different areas (e.g., a circle,
a sector of a circle, an intersection of three circles, and other
shapes) that are rendered by current positioning systems for the
location of an entity. In these cases, it is usual to approximate
the position of the entity to a pair of coordinates following
not normalized methods.
Furthemore, there do not exist common databases and
directories (gazzetters) for geographical names, addresses or
Point of Interest. Currently there is work in progress regarding
the development of infrastructures for spatial information
(e.g., the European INSPIRE work [28]), which include the
elaboration of consensuated databases for geographical names
and addresses, but there will pass sometime till they are
adopted by commercial services.
In order that the proposed federation of hosts works, there
is the need that they share a normalized way to interpretate
the location information given by current positioning systems,
a common representation language (such as GML or a profile
of it) to represent the location information of entities and that
they use some common infraestructure for spatial information
(e.g., common gazzetters which can be referenced).
A solution for interpreting in a normalized way the various
shapes of location provided by different location determination
services could be to use a common grid structure (such as the
one proposed in [29]) as reference in order to interpret the
location without loosing information.
In our example, the specific location of the coffee shop
could be identified using one of the cells of the grid defined in
[29] (which can easily provide granularities of 1 meter). These
would allow the location information to propagate through the
chain of federated hosts without loosing accuracy and correct-
ness. Each host could use then this information to interpret
it respect their own databases if needed. In the example, the
mall’s location determination system would produce the same
information as before (address and local identifier) and the
normalized location respect the grid for the coffee shop local.
Fire Eagle would try to interpret the data received from Alice
in the best available way without loosing information. As no
direct match is possible and Fire Eagle would be unable to
interpret the coffee shop identifier, Fire Eagle would store
the address and the received normalized location. This is
the information that Google Latitude would receive, who can
interpret the address and the normalized location to a pair
of coordinates, but still conserve the normalized location and
trasmit it to Teo. This way, Teo can provide an accurate and
correct location description of the location of the coffee shop
Fig. 6. Illustration of how scopes could be configured at the LSAM for
mapping different granularities if an interoperable hierarchical structure for
location information can be used.
he wants to visit to the mall’s location navigation service.
Till now, we have assumed in this use case that all the
services are allowed to access the best available location
information for Alice, in whatever granularity it comes. This
does not reflect the desired situation, because Alice may have
interest in authorizing the access to her location information
with different granularities for different services or for differ-
ent requesting parties.
Having a hierachical structure to represent location infor-
mation would ease this task from the user point of view, as
it would be possible to define policies such as “Provide my
location information (whatever the spatial layer used to rep-
resent it) with a maximum granularity of 1 kilometer”. Using
a hierarchical structure for describing location information,
similar to part of the structure used in Yahoo’s GeoPlanet 5,
and a hierachical grid as reference, such as the one proposed
in [29], enables this feature. If the location of the entity can
be indentified by the name of a town, and the geographical
representation of this town fits inside the specified granularity
(using the grid as reference), access to this information (town
name) would be provided. The same can be made for other
types of location information description. If it does not fit,
for example, the user is located at a street that is 200 meters
long and has configured a maximum granularity of 1 kilometer
for this service, some degradation process using the grid and
the hierachical structure for the used spatial layer (in this case,
addresses) should be done in order to find the most appropriate
resolution and description for the location information. In the
example, a parent of the specific street where the user is
located could be provided, if possible, or, if not possible, the
normalized location using the grid as representation.
Of course, in our use case, if the location information has to
propagate through the federation of hosts, its accuracy may be
reduced, but not its correcteness if the reference grid is used.
Having a hierachical mechanism to represent location in-
formation, is also useful for mapping different granularities
as different scopes in the LSAM in an elegant way. Some
examples for Alice’s location scopes representing different
granularities can be seen in Figure 6.
Considering a grid for representing location information
would also allow to incorporate more easily some spatial
cloaking scheme (see, for example, [30]) to further protect
5 http://developer.yahoo.com/geo/geoplanet/guide/concepts.html#hierarchy
the privacy of users.
IV. SUMMARY AND OPEN ISSUES
In this paper we have analyzed some of the problems
for providing an user-managed system for sharing the user’s
location information in the Future Internet and we have pro-
posed a set of architectural mechanisms that allow to address
these issues. The three presented use cases and the provided
discussion illustrate the complexity of providing such user-
managed sharing location information system. Still, we have
already identified a set of open issues that should also be
addressed.
For example, location information has a temporal dimension
that should not be forgotten when representing and processing
spatial information. Location information for the past and the
future is already used in some location-based web services
(Google Latitude Location History feature stores past location
information for a user and Dopplr service is an example of
service that offers future location information).
It is foreseen that policies that depend on the location
of the Authorizing User and the Requester/Requesting Party
are used. If the policy is dependent on the position of the
Requesting Party, they are now considered as Claims in the
UMA framework, but specific issues for location claims should
be still studied. If policies depend also on the Authorizing
User’s location (e.g., “Share my location with my friend only
if we are nearby (within some specific distance)”, then, in
order to evaluate the policy, the LSAM should have access to
Alice’s location, which means that the LSAM may have to act
as a Requester. It should be studied how this kind of situations
can be incorporated in the UMA model.
A further issue that should also be investigated is how to
retrieve the location information of an entity independently
of the location service (Host) that can provide it. That is,
make the location information globally referenceable for any
party and for any location aware service. That would need
first making entities globally referenceable (for example, using
OpenID mechanisms or similar).
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